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Governing in nested 
institutions: environmental 
policy in the European Union and 
the case of packaging waste 
Thomas Gehring 
ABSTRACT The environmental policy of the European Community is nested within 
a broader institution devoted predominantly to market integration. It also co-exists with 
the domestic environmental policies of the member states. This institutional arrangement 
has important consequences for environmental governance in the present Union. Not 
only does the wide scope for domestic environmental action generate different logics of 
harmonization for the regulation of products and processes, it also creates an institutional 
preference for European product standards because this type of regulation allows a 
trade-off between environmental and single market concerns. This effect is demonstrated 
by the development of the originally purely environmentally motivated and process-
related directive on packaging and packaging waste adopted in 1994. During its 
preparation, this legislative project was supplemented with a strong product-related 
component that made a trade-off between policies possible and facilitated majority 
support in the Council. 
KEY WORDS European environmental policy; institutional framework; internal 
market policy; packaging waste; process standards; product standards. 
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Pursuing different policies in parallel within a comprehensive institutional frame-
work does not preclude that a genuine environmental policy reaching far beyond an 
appendix of single market policy emerges, but it may be expected to affect out-
comes. Moreover, policy-making at the European level does not replace the 
unilateral environmental policies of the member states; it merely supplements them. 
Hence, European environmental policy is subject to a horizontal tension among 
different policies pursued at the European level and a vertical tension between the 
levels of policy-making. It is most heavily influenced, however, by the cross-level 
and cross-policy conflict between domestically enacted environmental standards 
that undermine market integration and European single market policy. 
Although awareness of the relevance of the institutional framework for the 
understanding of European policy-making is growing (Tsebelis 1994; Peters 1995), 
environmental policy analyses are still largely actor-oriented. They tend to focus on 
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the struggle among various types of actor, for example member states, interest 
groups, or institutionally created actors like the Commission or the European 
Parliament (Heritier et al. 1994; Golub 1996). Implicitly or explicitly, these 
approaches take sides within the debate between intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 
1993) and neo-functionalism (Sbragia 1992; Sandholtz 1992) on the most suitable 
theoretical framework for an analysis of the European Community (now Union). 
Yet, it is the still largely under-explored (Caporaso and Keeler 1995: 49-51) 
institutional framework establishing supranational actors and providing sub-
national actors with opportunities for intervention that supports the decision-
making system and relates otherwise unrelated decision processes to each other 
(Gehring 1996). 
This article explores the institutional framework within which the participating 
actors pursue their interests in European environmental policy-making. In its first 
part, two key factors determining the logics of harmonization in the Community 
are identified, namely a) the co-existence of European environmental policy with 
European single market policy and with domestic environmental policy and b) the 
particular, institutionally established delimitation between the latter policies. These 
factors create an economically and environmentally motivated institutional pref-
erence for product regulation over process regulation. In the second part of the 
article, the impact of the European Community institutional framework on the 
European policy on packaging waste is explored. This policy culminated in the 
adoption of the heavily disputed directive on packaging and packaging waste in 
1994 that is rooted in European environmental policy as well as in the lasting 
endeavour to protect the single market from adverse effects of domestic environ-
mental action. This double basis enabled interested actors to supplement the 
originally envisaged process regulation with a product-related component and 
move the thrust of the project toward product regulation. Despite the sharp 
conceptional distinction between product and process regulation, a project does not 
always clearly fall into one of these categories. Manoeuvring contributes to creating 
a highly complex outcome and implicitly transfers a wide margin of decision-
making from the cumbersome Council negotiation system to other co-ordinating 
mechanisms within the Community system. 
2. NESTING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY WITHIN A LARGER 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Environmental policy in an economic integration organization 
The core of the European Union is undoubtedly formed by the three original 
communities, in particular the expansive European Economic Community (now: 
European Community, EC) founded by the member states to establish and 
maintain a common market for goods, services, capital and labour, and more 
recently supplemented by the single market programme and the monetary union 
project. Without this economic core the Community would remain a torso. Market 
integration has always been the centre of European integration. The EC as the 
governance institution established to achieve this task would not be capable of 
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assisting the member states without developing mechanisms and selection criteria 
(Gehring 1994: 438^3) that privilege options promoting the internal market. 
Therefore, Community policy focuses primarily on harmonizing national laws that 
pose obstacles to trade (Taylor 1983). 
However, the Community is no longer limited to market integration. Over time, 
several separate 'flanking policies' have evolved, among them environmental policy 
(Hildebrand 1992). Identified in the early 1970s as a new area of Community 
activity, European environmental policy has created numerous acts of environ-
mental legislation (Rehbinder and Stewart 1985; Johnson and Corcelle 1989; Haigh 
1992). From the outset, this new area of policy-making was supported by its own 
organizational apparatus, composed of a separate unit within the Commission that 
became a Directorate-General in 1981, a specific committee of the European 
Parliament and a council of environmental ministers. Substantively, the new policy 
relied on its own regularly revised programmes. Already the first programme (OJ C 
(73) 112) made abundantly clear that environmental policy had its own goals and 
was not at all to be understood as an appendix to the Community's internal market 
policy. Hence, from an institution primarily devoted to economic integration, an 
institutionally separate, substantively independent and organizationally distinct 
part emerged that, other things being equal, would favour a high standard of 
environmental protection. 
Nesting different policies in a larger institution creates the risk of conflict. 
However, the selection criteria of the two policies do not necessarily contradict each 
other. Environmental policy measures may support market integration and remove 
trade barriers, and single market policy may contribute to raising environmental 
standards. In fact, prior to the introduction of specific competences over environ-
mental issues into the EEC Treaty in 1987, European environmental policy was 
almost exclusively conducted in the name of market-related harmonization of 
national laws (Rehbinder and Stewart 1985). 
Another aspect to be taken into account is that the emergence of European 
environmental policy does not hinder the member states from pursuing their own 
policy to protect the environment. The behaviour of citizens and economic actors in 
the Union's territory is governed by European environmental regulation as well as 
domestic legislation in a particular form of 'multi-level governance' (Marks et al. 
1995; Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1996). Hence, environmental regulation in 
the Union does not necessarily come about in the form of harmonized European 
standards. Frequently, progressive domestic action even provides models and 
precedents that are taken up later at the European level (Hentier et al. 1994; Hentier 
1996). The parallel existence of (at least) two levels of environmental governance 
may cause a vertical, subsidiarity-type tension that centres around the distribution 
of regulatory competences between levels. However, despite different approaches 
adopted by the member states and varying degrees of regulatory depth, unilaterally 
adopted environmental action and European standards will generally intervene to 
raise the level of protection. Like the horizontal tension among policies at the 
European level, the vertical tension between the levels of policy-making does not 
necessarily create conflict. . . . . . . 
However, as illustrated in Figure 1, European environmental policy is seriously 
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Figure 1 Nesting of European environmental policy 
affected by a third type of tension, i.e. between domestic environmental action and 
European single market policy. Domestic environmental policy establishes 
country-specific standards despite their possibly adverse effects on trade. Yet, single 
market policy is directed at removing national legislation posing barriers to trade. 
The former of these policies is regulative, while the latter is essentially deregulative. 
Therefore, these policies may be diametrically opposed to each other. 
This conflict suggests a closer consideration of the conditions under which 
domestic environmental action threatens to contradict European single market 
policy (Weinstock 1984; Scharpf 1996). Process-related standards, e.g. emission 
standards for power stations or measures to protect habitats of wild animals, 
generally do not interfere with trans-boundary trade. If domestically enacted, they 
may require investment in abatement technology or restrict the exploitation of 
farmland and thus reduce the competitiveness of domestic producers, but they do 
not constitute obstacles to the exchange of goods and services in the internal market. 
In contrast, unilaterally enacted product standards prohibit the marketing of 
products that do not fulfil the required conditions. Regularly, they disfavour 
imported goods and put the burden of adaptation on foreign producers. If a 
member state requires cars to be fitted with catalytic converters, it automatically 
excludes cars without such fittings from its market. Hence, it is product-related 
environmental regulation that creates the conflict between the collective intention 
of the member states to integrate their markets and their desire to protect their 
environment by domestic policy-making. This type of 'federal' tension stems from 
the close interrelationship of two policies and two levels of policy-making within a 
single institutional framework. It distinguishes European environmental policy-
making from policy-making both in the traditional nation state and in the inter-
national system. 
2.2 Domestic environmental action in the single market 
The fundamental conflict between domestic environmental policy and European 
single market policy raises two interrelated questions. H o w far does the existence of 
Governing in nested institutions 341 
the single market limit options for domestic environment action even in the absence 
of harmonizing secondary European legislation, and how far can the member states 
still pursue their own environmental policies even if they thwart European single 
market policy? 
The EC Treaty does not address process-related domestic environmental policy-
making (except for market-distorting taxation and subsidies) because this policy 
does not usually affect the operation of the single market. However, it addresses 
product regulation by prohibiting import quotas and 'all measures having 
equivalent effect' (Art. 30). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) interprets this 
clause extensively and considers 'all trading rules enacted by Member States which 
are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, ultra-
Community trade . . . as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative 
restrictions' (C 8/74 [Dassonville], ECR 1974: 837). However, in Art. 36 the Treaty 
provides for a number of exceptions regarding measures inter alia 'justified on 
grounds of . . . the protection of health and life of humans, animals and plants. 
Hence, domestically enacted product standards are generally prohibited but under 
certain circumstances they are justified in spite of their detrimental effect on the 
single market (Geradin 1993:153-5; Krämer 1993). 
The institutionalized standard for the appraisal of product-related national 
measures is thus composed of two elements that need to be balanced on a case-
by-case basis. The Community assigns the final decision of such cases to the ECJ 
(Weiler 1991; Burley and Mattli 1993). Beginning in the 1970s, the Court declared, 
in a series of decisions that gathered a considerable amount of public attention, 
numerous national legislative acts incompatible with European law. O l particular 
relevance were the decisions on the German requirement for a minimum content ot 
alcohol in liquor (C 120/8 [Cassis de Dijon], ECR 1979: 649-75), the German 
prohibition to market beer not produced according to the 'purity requirement 
(C 178/84 ECR 1987: 1227-77) and the Italian regulation on the ingredients ot 
pasta (C 407/85, ECR 1988:4233-83). All these decisions had a deregulat.ve ettect. 
They rendered national protective measures inapplicable without replacing them 
with any regulations at the European level. The 'Cassis de Dijon jurisdiction (Alter 
and Meun.er-Aitsahalia 1994) became the basis for the hypothesis that the scope for 
autonomous national action was increasingly limited by Court-driven negative 
integration' (Scharpf 1996: 126-8). However, in all these cases ^ e responsible 
governments had not convincingly justified their legal measures. Had they been 
able to prove that a risk to, for example, human health existed or thatsc.ent.fi 
uncertainty prevailed about such risk, they wouId 1 ^ W e d a greater^ scope 
from which to choose their own level of protection (CI 78/84 [German Beer] ECR 
1987: 1273). In fact, the Cassis jurisdiction forces the member states to actively 
justify their domestically enacted product standards in light of the exceptions 
envisaged in the Treaty. . _ , . 
Drafted in the 1950s, Art. 36 of the EC Treaty recognizes measures to protect the 
health and life of humans, animals and plants as justified, but it does not address 
environmental protection as such. Both the Commission and the Court, however, 
consider envi roLenta l protection an important Community interest that warrant 
domeSt .callyenactedpr0ductstandards.Intwolandmarkdecisions,theCourtheld 
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that a Danish ban on beverage cans (C 302/86, ECR 1988: 4607-33) and a Wallonian 
prohibition of waste imports (C 2/90, ECR 1992: 4431-81) were justified for 
reasons of environmental protection despite their adverse effects on the internal 
market. The situation may be summarized as follows: 'A national measure to 
protect the environment is permissible to the extent that it is objectively capable of 
reaching the aim, that it is not discriminatory and that the desired objective cannot 
be attained by less restrictive measures' (Kramer 1995:127). Despite Court-driven 
negative integration under the Cassis de Dijon jurisdiction, the member states enjoy 
an almost unlimited freedom to choose their own level of environmental protection 
as long as specific Community measures are absent. However, their measures will 
be appraised against their own environmental goals. Hence, the internal market as 
established by the EC Treaty and enforced by the Commission and the Court does 
not seriously hinder the member states from pursuing their own environmental 
policy. 
2.3 Harmonization to limit unilateral action 
The institutional choice to favour domestic environmental policy over European 
single market policy may be most welcome from an environmental point of view. 
Yet, it is awkward from a market integration perspective and it does not ensure that 
the member states actually engage in activities to protect their environment. 
European environmental policy is the institutional response to these shortcomings. 
Unlike negative integration of the Cassis de Dijon jurisdiction type, it replaces 
national measures with harmonized European standards. It forces the member 
states actively to take decisions and, at least partially, removes policy-making from 
the domestic level. Moreover, it is apt to reconcile single market policy and environ-
mental policy while avoiding the pursuit of one goal at the expense of the other. To 
achieve these regulatory tasks, harmonization does not have to fully deprive the 
member states of their scope for independent action. In fact, European environ-
mental legislation resorted to a number of different forms of partial harmonization 
(Rehbinder and Stewart 1985: 7-9) to reduce the degree of consensus required and 
to accelerate the pace of decision-making. Nevertheless, it is harmonization, not the 
existence of the internal market, that limits the freedom for national environmental 
policy-making. However, product regulation and process regulation follow quite 
different logics and are driven by different factors. 
2.3,1 Product-related harmonization 
The setting of European environmental product standards must be primarily 
designed to readjust the balance between domestic environmental policy and 
European single market policy. This balance will be restored if products meeting 
harmonized standards can be freely traded and marketed throughout the Com-
munity. The logic of single market policy demands that product-related harmoniz-
ation establishes maximum standards and predominantly limits the freedom of 
action of countries with high standards. After all, high domestic standards exclude 
products from a domestic market even if they are produced in accordance with the 
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laws of the producer country, while low domestic standards do comparatively little 
harm to trade. The logic of environmental protection is quite the reverse. Environ-
mental deterioration is the consequence of low standards. Environmental product 
regulation must primarily address countries with low standards and limit their 
freedom of action. It will set comparatively high minimum standards while avoid-
ing maximum standards that unnecessarily restrict the active environmental policy 
of the 'progressive' states. Accordingly, product-related European environmental 
regulation is governed by two diametrically opposed logics of harmonization. A 
solution for this collision is not provided for in the general rules of the institution. It 
will eventually have to be found case by case in the decision-making process that is 
still dominated by intergovernmental negotiations in the Council. 
All the member states are interested in harmonized product standards that 
enable them to enjoy the advantages of the single market. After all, the market 
constitutes not only the core of the Community, it may also be assumed to 
constitute the main reason for joining the EC. Yet, the member states may have 
different preferences over the appropriate level of environmental protection 
envisaged by a harmonized standard. In game-theoretic terms, this constellation of 
interests reflects a 'Battle of the Sexes' situation (Scharpf 1996: 118-19). While 
generally not being prepared to reduce their existing standards, the high-standard 
countries may be inclined to sacrifice their option for future independent 
environmental policy-making in the regulated area to support market integration. 
They will not do so, however, unless the low-standard countries accept minimum 
standards at a level significantly above the 'lowest common denominator'. Thus, 
environmental product regulation involves a trade-off between the single market 
and environmental interests. It will come about in the form of minimum and 
maximum standards (i.e. either full harmonization or a corridor) at a considerable 
level of protection because high-level domestic regulation drives European product 
standards up. 
A product standard harmonized in this way constitutes an almost optimal 
solution from a single market point of view, because it removes obstacles to trade in 
the internal market. The outcome is more ambiguous from an environmental 
perspective. It enhances the level of protection in the low-standard countries, but it 
also restricts the future development of domestic environmental policy by 
individual member states. Implicitly, harmonized product standards undermine the 
momentum driving European environmental standards up and raise the problem of 
'obsolescence' (Rehbinder and Stewart 1985: 279). Over time, they may create a 
situation in which the member states have already sacrificed their competence to 
regulate a subject unilaterally while the Community system is (still) unable to 
respond effectively to demands of environmental protection owing to high 
consensus requirements. Harmonized product standards may thus lead right into 
the 'joint decision trap' (Scharpf 1985). The problem is illustrated by the long 
struggle over the introduction of catalytic converters for cars (Arp 1993) that took 
place in a subject area already harmonized by an earlier directive at a low level of 
environmental protection. 
The single market Article, 100a, introduced into the EC Treaty in 1987 reflects 
the harmonization logic of product standards. It does not legally require the setting 
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of maximum standards, but it suggests that maximum or full harmonization will be 
the normal case. It commits the Commission to a high level of environmental 
protection and includes an opening clause that allows member states to maintain, 
under certain conditions, existing domestic environmental regulation above the 
harmonized European standard. Owing to deliberately ambiguous wording, it is 
not entirely clear whether this clause also enables them to introduce unilateral 
measures after a harmonization directive has entered into force. N o member state 
has ever attempted to do so. Since the opening clause is altogether very rarely used 
(Krämer 1995: 106-7) and the Court has further tightened the conditions for its 
application (C 41/93 [PCP] ECR 1994: 1-1829-52), it does not seem to have the 
effect of actually encouraging continued environmental progress. 
Hence, the institutional acceptance of unilaterally enacted environmental 
product standards in the absence of specific European legislation enables the 
member states to harmonize these standards at a comparatively high level of environ-
mental protection. Yet, harmonization of a subject area undermines the force 
driving standards up. However motivated their adoption is, the logic of harmoniz-
ation turns product standards predominantly into measures of single market policy. 
2.3.2 Process-related harmonization 
In contrast to product regulation, process standards are not affected by the 
triangular relationship among policies and levels because their harmonization is not 
a major point of concern for single market policy. They are largely dominated by the 
tension between European and domestic environmental policy. However, there are 
two exceptions to this rule (Stewart 1995). First, a country may gain competitive 
advantages by externalizing environmental costs, for example, by polluting 
international rivers and seas or by causing trans-boundary air pollution. Second, the 
desire of member states to create or uphold competitive advantages for their 
industries may lead to a 'race to the bottom' or a 'stalemate at the bottom'. Member 
states may be inclined to successively lower their standards to reinforce their 
competitive advantage only to find themselves collectively trapped in a vicious 
circle. Probably more important in the field of environmental protection, they may 
refrain from individually introducing a measure for fear of a competitive 
disadvantage. In these cases the market mechanism fails and single market policy 
may require harmonization. Distortions of this type are caused by low-standard 
countries. Accordingly, European single market policy requires minimum 
standards for process regulation. In contrast to product regulation, additional 
maximum standards would not contribute at all to solving the problem at stake. 
European environmental policy also focuses on raising the level of protection in 
countries with low standards by introducing European minimum requirements. 
However, all environmentally problematic subject areas are generally suited for 
European environmental regulation irrespective of their relevance for single market 
policy. 
Again, the level of protection must be determined largely by the member states in 
the Council. High-standard countries may be assumed generally to favour 
harmonization at a comparatively high level of protection that both improves the state 
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of the environment and contributes to reducing the competitive advantage of the 
low-standard countries. European process standards hardly restrict their options for 
independent action because they usually exceed harmonized minimum standards. In 
contrast, low-standard member states, i.e. the intended addressees of harmonization, 
may be expected to prefer no or very low European standards that do not threaten 
their competitive advantage, or overly limit their freedom of unilateral action. Except 
for the 'race to the bottom' case, in which all countries have 'mixed motives' and a 
collective incentive to compromise, there is no real incentive for the low-standard 
countries to reach agreement. This does not mean that process regulation is altogether 
impossible to achieve in negotiation systems (Heritier et al. 1994). Yet, it may be 
expected to be usually more difficult to agree upon than product regulation 
(Rehbinder and Stewart 1985:9-11; Scharpf 1996:119-21) and, therefore, remain at a 
comparatively low level. Hence, attempts to improve the state of the environment by 
European process standards will frequently end in 'structural subsidiarity', i.e. in the 
de facto re-transfer of the regulatory competence to the member state level, caused by 
the inability of the Council to reach substantive decisions. Environmental process 
regulation within the EC may be expected to resemble international environmental 
policy-making more closely than product regulation. 
From a normative point of view this finding may be disappointing (Rehbinder 
and Stewart 1985). However, the reduced ability of the Community system to set 
process standards does not cause a regulatory gap as long as the member states retain 
their own regulatory capacity. In the 'multi-level governance system' of the present 
Union, regulation does not necessarily have to be decided upon at the European 
level. The member states may well exercise their regulatory autonomy as far as 
possible while empowering the Community (only) where necessary (Scharpf 1993). 
Therefore, the current challenge of harmonized environmental process regulation 
on subsidiarity grounds is not itself problematic, but the occurrence of 'structural 
subsidiarity' creates difficulties in the two types of situation mentioned in which the 
member states have already lost their individual regulatory capacity and depend on 
European regulation (Scharpf 1996). 
The environmental competence of Art. 130 r-t, introduced into the EC Treaty in 
1987, clearly reflects the logic of process harmonization. It is exclusively directed at 
setting minimum standards and ensures that member states are not hindered from 
enacting standards higher than those adopted under this competence (Art. 130 t). 
Therefore, it is not at all suited for product regulation. Moreover, the EC Treaty 
stipulates specifically that the harmonization of process standards at the European 
level is subject to the subsidiarity principle (Art. 130 r). Hence, it is recognized that 
process regulation may be dealt with at both the European and the member state 
level and implied that there must be at least some justification for setting European 
standards. 
2.3.3 Institutionalized preference for the harmonization of product standards 
over the regulation of processes 
The institutional arrangement creates a peculiar tension between domestic 
environmental policy and European single market policy that influences both the 
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demand and the opportunities for active European environmental policy-making. 
Single market policy devoted to the removal of trade barriers focuses almost 
exclusively on the harmonization of product standards at any suitable level of 
environmental protection, while process regulation is of little relevance. However, 
European environmental policy may also favour product regulation over process 
regulation because the former promises substantive improvement in the 
low-standard countries and a continuing high level of protection in the progressive 
member states. In contrast, substantive process regulation is generally difficult to 
achieve and always threatened with being trapped in a 'structural subsidiarity'. 
Accordingly, the Commission as a corporate actor pursuing European single 
market policy and European environmental policy simultaneously has every reason 
to prefer the setting of product standards over process standards when designing the 
outline of a legislative project. 
3. EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN PRACTICE: THE 
DIRECTIVE O N PACKAGING A N D PACKAGING WASTE 
The recently adopted directive on packaging and packaging waste reflects the 
Commission's lasting intention to establish a European policy on packaging waste 
and its constant endeavour to protect the single market from adverse effects of 
unilateral environmental action. It demonstrates the impact of the nesting of 
European environmental policy within an institution that is primarily concerned 
with market integration. 
3.1 The context: European packaging waste policy and the struggle over 
Danish bottles 
The Commission began to prepare the proposal for a directive on containers of 
liquids for human consumption in 1975. The project was initially directed at 
promoting the use of refill packaging and stirred up vigorous protest within 
interested industries. After several years of preparation, the Commission presented 
an entirely process-oriented and environmentally motivated proposal (COM (81) 
1987 final) that did not refer at all to the possible single market implications of 
packaging waste policy and was based solely on the general enabling clause of the 
Treaty (Art. 235). The proposal merely established a European framework for the 
elaboration of national packaging waste policies and obliged the member states to 
develop annual programmes for reducing packaging in household waste and 
increasing the share of refillable and/or recyclable packaging. Hence, the 
Commission had given up the idea of a coherent and uniform European packaging 
waste policy. When the directive on containers of liquids for human consumption 
(85/339/EEC, OJ L (85) 176) was eventually adopted in 1985, it could be conceived 
at best as the first step on the long way toward a Community policy on packaging 
waste (Johnson and Corcelle 1989: 179-80; Haigh 1992: 5.8). 
The conflict between domestic environmental policy in the packaging waste 
sector and European internal market concerns had an equally long history. In 1977 
Denmark prohibited the marketing of soft drinks in one-way bottles and cans. The 
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regulation undoubtedly constituted a - generally prohibited - obstacle to trade. The 
Commission had not yet decided whether it considered it as a justified unilateral 
action to protect the environment or as a violation of the duty to avoid trade 
restrictions (OJ C (79) 214/5), when it was informed in 1980 that the marketing of 
beer and soft drinks in Denmark was henceforth allowed only in licensed refillable 
containers. The Commission received protests from beverage and packaging 
producers and trade groups located outside Denmark that were supported in 
particular by the United Kingdom. In 1984 it persuaded the Danish government to 
modify its regulation so as to allow foreign producers and importers to market 
beverages up to a fixed maximum quantity (3000 hi per year) in non-licensed 
containers under the condition that they established their own deposit and 
collection system. Metal cans remained prohibited (C 302/86, ECR 1988: 4608-9). 
Despite this partial success the Commission instituted an infringement 
procedure that reached the Court in 1986. The Commission was then forced to 
argue in favour of the protection of the internal market without being inconsistent 
with the Community's packaging waste policy under the brand new directive on 
containers of liquids for human consumption. While this directive did not 
positively oblige the member states to introduce or develop refill systems, it 
expressly encouraged them to do so even though refill systems implicitly privilege 
local producers and almost inevitably create obstacles to free trade. Accordingly, the 
Commission had to accept a comparatively wide margin of choice for the member 
states to develop their own packaging waste policy. It did not challenge the Danish 
mandatory deposit and refill system, the strict ban on metal cans and the qualitative 
restrictions on the exceptional marketing of imported beverages in one-way 
containers. The Commission considered the Danish measures applicable to foreign 
producers 'to be incompatible with the principle of free movement of goods solely 
because of the limitations as to quantity and duration which they impose' (C 302/86, 
ECR 1988: 4611; emphasis added). The Court entirely followed the Commission 
position (C 302/86, ECR 1988: 4607-33). The decision in the Danish bottles case is 
frequently seen as a rare exception from the general Cassis de Dijon jurisdiction 
(Koppen 1993: 140-1). It effectively shelters national environmental measures in 
areas that are not subject to European harmonization legislation against the threat 
of Court-driven deregulation. Thus, it has the effect of forcing the Community to 
promote harmonization in order to contain the now almost unlimited freedom of 
domestic environmental action and to re-adjust the balance in favour of the single 
market gradually. 
The restrictive effect of the judgment on the control of unilaterally adopted 
domestic action became apparent when Germany announced its packaging waste 
ordinance in 1990. The regulation reached far beyond any existing European 
approach to packaging waste and applied to all primary, secondary and transport 
packaging. It intended to stabilize existing refill systems and introduced a 
mandatory deposit on one-way packaging for beverages, detergents and paints as 
well as the general obligation of retailers to recycle packaging. Alternatively, 
producers and retailers could establish nationwide a separate collection system for 
packaging waste (the later 'green dot system'). Again, the Commission received 
complaints from interested industries based outside Germany. Although it 
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scrutinized the system as to its conformity with the single market and entered into 
deliberations with the German government (Com (92) 278 final), it did not institute 
a formal infringement procedure. The German regulation and a parallel Dutch 
arrangement made clear that problems of this type would proliferate in the future. 
Hence, a new project for establishing a harmonized European packaging waste 
policy could be linked to single market policy. In this case, it might be expected to 
create product standards and ensure the free circulation of packaging that meets 
these standards. It could also be designed to launch a fresh initiative for an 
environmental European packaging waste policy that would have to incorporate 
programmes to contain the amount of packaging waste and handle it in an environ-
mentally sound manner. This approach could be expected to be more process-
oriented. 
3.2 Preparation of the directive 
3.2.1 The first stage: an environmental and process-oriented project 
The German and Dutch regulations had an immediate impact on the European 
packaging waste policy. Prior to their announcement, the Commission followed a 
selective approach toward packaging waste and was preparing proposals on plastic 
waste and metal packaging (SEC (89) 934 final). Yet, in 1990 the Directorate-
General of the Environment (DG XI) started preparations for a directive addressing 
all packaging waste. The first 'Outline Proposal' (April 1991) envisaged three basic 
measures. First, the member countries should ensure that the amount of packaging 
waste per person does not exceed the EC average. This duty would have required a 
serious reduction by the wealthy northern member states with a high consumption 
of packaging. Second, the member states should ensure that within five years at least 
60 per cent of packaging waste is recycled and another 30 per cent incinerated with 
energy recovery, while no more than 10 per cent is disposed of untreated. According 
to the Commission these targets amounted to a threefold increase in the share of 
recycled packaging. Third, member states should ensure that marketed packaging 
does not exceed certain limits as to the content of heavy metals and other dangerous 
substances. 
All these duties, including the proposed product standards, came about in the 
form of minimum standards designed to enhance the level of environmental 
protection. The original Commission proposal envisaged an exclusively environ-
mental project and focused primarily on process regulation. It would have a positive 
impact on the single market only if the member states implemented the harmonized 
European approach and voluntarily refrained from adopting additional measures 
on packaging waste. 
Despite the protest of numerous interest groups, D G XI kept its environmental 
approach. The first comprehensive text for the operative part of the directive (Draft 
No. 1) retained the main duties of the Outline, but added some auxiliary obligations 
derived from the Danish bottles case judgment, including the duty to observe the 
proportionality of restrictions caused by implementing measures. In this form the 
draft proposal was discussed by the chefs des cabinets. This steering body, 
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immediately below the College of Commissioners, requested that the ambitious 
environmental project be thoroughly revised in collaboration with other DGs, 
especially the directorate responsible for single market affairs (DG III). 
Subsequently, the process standards of the proposal underwent some important 
changes. The Commission dropped the heavily criticized ceiling on the amount of 
packaging waste per capita for conceptional and political reasons (COM (92) 287 
final). This obligation would have had the undesired effect of favouring 
comparatively light composite and plastic packaging over heavier materials (glass) 
even though it was more difficult to recycle. Countries exceeding the European per 
capita average of packaging waste might also have been forced to promote refill 
systems - a consequence that stirred vigorous political resistance and seemed, 
moreover, difficult to justify by 'life cycle analyses' of different types of packaging 
(Porter 1995). Accordingly, the recycling requirements became more important 
within the project. The originally envisaged, ambitious figures were retained 
throughout the preparation process. However, the obligation was somewhat 
relaxed by an extension of the transitory period from five to ten years and the 
introduction of a set of intermediate goals. It was also tightened by applying the 
recycling targets not only to packaging waste at large but also to separate classes of 
material, thus preventing a country from meeting its obligations by merely 
recycling the comparatively easily recyclable heavy fraction (glass and metal) while 
incinerating plastics and composite packaging. 
All together, these modifications slightly weakened the proposal, but they 
largely responded to difficulties inherent in the regulated subject area and did not 
seem unreasonable. The proposal submitted by the Commission in autumn 1992 
(OJ C (92) 263) still comprised environmentally ambitious targets. However, the 
original approach as developed during the intra-Commission preparatory process 
ran into the general difficulty of adopting process standards at a high level of 
protection in a negotiation system. It was not very probable that the member states 
would support the Europeanization of a packaging waste policy of this type. 
3.2.2 An additional product-related single market component 
The truly interesting development during the intra-Commission preparatory 
process was not related to the process standard dimension. Rather, it concerned the 
Commission's response to the fact that domestic packaging waste policies 
constantly undermined market integration without legally violating single market 
obligations. Starting late in 1991 the drafts began to address the single market aspect 
of packaging waste, but effective protection of the single market in the sector was 
not at all simple. Any express regulation of national implementation measures 
(Draft No . 3) would primarily restate the proportionality criteria developed by the 
Court and did not add anything new beyond specific notification procedures. 
Therefore, the single market dimension as officially proposed came about in the 
form of a number of product standards, accompanied by the general obligation to 
accept that packaging meeting these standards be marketed throughout the internal 
market. The envisaged limits for the content of certain dangerous substances in 
packaging were supplemented by requirements for refillable and recyclable 
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packaging. The member states were obliged to ensure that these standards were met 
(i.e. minimum standards), but they would also have the duty to accept on their 
markets packaging that fulfilled the European standards (i.e. de facto maximum 
standards for imported packaging). This additional product-related component 
effectively addressed the difficulties created by the Danish and German schemes 
that distorted the single market and de facto discriminated against foreign producers 
by actively promoting one type of packaging (e.g. refillable containers) over 
another, or by discouraging or even prohibiting certain types of packaging (e.g. 
beverage cans). 
Hence, during the preparation phase within the Commission the project had 
moved considerably on the continuum between pure environmental policy and 
pure single market policy toward the latter. The proposal as officially submitted by 
the Commission was made up of two rather different components. It combined 
environmentally motivated process standards with product regulation 
predominantly motivated by single market concerns. The former provided the 
driving force for the entire project, but they were burdened with the difficulties 
inherent in harmonizing process regulation. The latter raised the resistance of 
environmentally progressive countries. In combination the two components 
increased the prospect of agreement on the whole package. 
3.3 The political decision process 
Appropriately based on the internal market competence (Art. 100 a), the directive 
was decided upon first under the collaboration procedure and later, after the entry 
into force of the Maastricht Treaty, by co-decision. Despite its extended rights 
under these procedures, the European Parliament did not exert much influence on 
the substance agreed upon (Golub 1996), while the Council considerably modified 
the proposal during the negotiations on its common position. 
The newly introduced single market component remained virtually undisputed. 
Even the small group of environmentally concerned countries (Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, the Netherlands) did not attempt to erase it from the directive. Moreover, 
these countries even accepted a significant downgrading of the requirements for 
recyclable and refillable packaging. However, they succeeded in introducing two 
new articles on waste prevention and on the promotion of refill systems that did not 
establish positive obligations but may have the effect of expanding opportunities for 
future domestic action. Implicitly, these provisions limit the impact of the single 
market component. 
In contrast, the ambitious recycling goals proposed by the Commission were 
heavily disputed. They were vehemently supported by the group of environ-
mentalist countries that had already established their own recycling systems and 
would be least affected by high European requirements. Not surprisingly, they 
were equally vigorously rejected by countries with a low standard in the sector 
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom). First, the Council 
postponed the decision on the long-term targets and agreed to determine figures 
only for an intermediate step to be reached within five years. For this step the 
Commission had proposed a minimum of 60 per cent recovery and 40 per cent 
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recycling for each material of the total packaging waste. The Council lowered these 
figures considerably and settled for the duty to recover 50 per cent of the packaging 
waste, recycle 25 per cent of the total amount and (only) 15 per cent of each material. 
This compromise was further weakened by a temporary exemption for some low-
standard countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal). As generally expected for process 
regulation, the targets agreed upon were hardly ambitious. That they were accepted 
at all may be attributed to their linkage with other parts of the directive. 
This result would have constituted a case of 'structural subsidiarity' that would 
have retransferred most of the regulatory competence to the domestic level, if the 
member states had been allowed to go beyond these harmonized standards. 
However, several member states claimed that the German collection system under-
mined their own systems because it flooded their secondary raw materials markets 
with large quantities of glass and paper sold at low and occasionally even 'negative 
prices'. France, followed by other member states, threatened to close its borders to 
these imports (Agence Europe, 5-6 July 1993). The very success of the German 
system caused distortions of the internal market because subsidies of environ-
mentally benign recycling resulted in economic difficulties. To solve this 'German 
problem', the Council supplemented the envisaged minimum goals with an 
environmentally entirely unsound cap limiting recovery to a maximum of 65 per 
cent and recycling to 45 per cent of the total amount of packaging waste. Denmark, 
Germany and the Netherlands struggled hard, and eventually successfully, for an 
exemption that will allow exceeding the cap if a member state proves to have a 
sufficiently high capacity to process the waste collected. With these changes the 
directive on packaging and packaging waste (94/62/EG, OJ L (94) 365) was adopted 
in December 1994. 
In the course of the Council negotiations both groups of member states 
succeeded in watering down those components of the package by which they were 
particularly affected. The environmentally concerned minority reduced the impact 
of the single market component and, in the final stage, also of the cap provision. The 
majority lowered the recovery and recycling targets to a level that did not require 
serious adaptation of existing programmes in most member states. The impact of 
this outcome on the packaging waste policy in the member countries is still difficult 
to assess. At best, it may boost recycling interests and launch a positive feedback 
process that could lead to enhanced figures later on. However, the directive will 
almost certainly affect the scope for domestic packaging waste policies. It 
establishes a new, but highly complex and therefore unclear, institutional basis for 
future national action. Environmentally progressive countries attempting to use the 
exemption clause to break the cap provision on the recovery and recycling quota, or 
trying to protect existing legislation under the opening clause of Art. 100 a (4), will 
have to meet still unclear conditions. Likewise, they may find the Commission, and 
eventually the Court, rejecting new measures in the packaging waste sector, such as 
a ban on PVC packaging, that most probably had been in conformity with 
European law prior to the adoption of the directive. Moreover, the new directive 
enables private parties to involve the ECJ via national courts. A producer or 
importer, believing himself to be adversely affected by the domestic packaging 
waste policy of a member state, may now choose an appropriate case and test 
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whether the directive has modified the legal situation as compared to the status 
based upon the Danish bottles case jurisdiction. 
Hence, the directive not only constitutes the - rather moderate - second step 
toward a European packaging waste policy. Within the framework of the European 
Community it will have an immediate impact on the single market policy and 
almost certainly affect the scope for future domestic action in the sector, even 
though the extent of this influence is not yet altogether clear. 
4. CONCLUSION 
European environmental policy emerges from an institution that is primarily 
devoted to economic integration and the establishment and maintenance of the 
internal market. It co-exists with other policies pursued in the same institutional 
framework, above all single market policy. It also co-exists with the domestic 
environmental policies of the member states. A policy decision adopted in one of 
these areas may generate undesired, and occasionally unexpected, consequences in 
other areas. The development of packaging waste policy in Europe illustrates this 
effect. Both domestic environmental action and European environmental policy 
interfered with single market policy and modified the context from which the 1994 
directive emerged. While product standards may be assumed to be more closely 
intertwined with other policies than process standards, the directive on packaging 
and packaging waste demonstrates that legislative projects cannot always be clearly 
assigned to one of these categories. Since the substantive problem was rooted in 
different policies, the project could be deliberately transferred from (almost) pure 
process regulation into a mixture of process and product regulation. This step raised 
the probability of the adoption of the entire project, including its process 
component. As expected for product regulation, the member states bargained over 
the trade-off between single market aspects and environmental concerns. However, 
despite its process component the adoption of the packaging waste directive 
followed primarily the logic of product regulation. 
To achieve majority support for the directive, the Council not only seriously 
watered down the individual parts of the package, it also added new elements that 
increased the complexity of the directive and created grey zones of unclear 
legislation. Sooner or later interested actors will attempt to exploit these grey zones. 
Conflicts will emerge and involve non-state actors, in particular the Commission 
and the Court as well as interested private parties instigating Court proceedings. 
Over time the initially broad margins for interpretation will be closed by secondary 
decisions, taking place, however, outside the Council negotiation system either in 
the form of bilateral negotiations, for example, between the Commission and a 
member state, or within the hierarchically organized judicial apparatus. In effect, 
the directive transfers a considerable part of collective decisions to be made to 
govern the sector from multilateral negotiations to other co-ordination 
mechanisms available within the institution, even though it does not specifically 
delegate these decisions to supranational actors. In this regard, the packaging waste 
policy also provides a lesson in governance within the multi-level system of the 
European Union. 
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